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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report describes dynamic combat models that reflect the effect of
information flows together with attrition capability upon combat progress and
outcome. Command and Control assets for each participant are modeled as endowed
with the capacity to guide combat; C is also vulnerable in that it may be delib-
erately targetted and reduced in effectiveness. Physical attrition is modeled
first by a deterministic rate process (Lanchesterian in nature), secondly by a
stochastic process related to the first by ideas related to those of stochastic
difference and differential equations.
The models are best exercised and explored on an interactive computer display,
A FORTRAN program exists for this purpose, with displays of hypothetical "histori-
cal" combat outcomes now appearing in tabular form. Graphical displays will be
provided in future work.
It seems likely that this model simulation can be developed into a gaming
tool, very conveniently playable by two persons who can elect various strategies
for force allocation, play the game, and learn from the results. An elaboration
of the model may serve as a means for assessing the importance of increased
effectiveness of equipment, either with respect to firing rate and accuracy or
time for information flow.





Many, if not most, conflicts between opposing forces R and B are conducted
3
under some form of Command, Control and Communications (C ) establishment super-
vision. Yet few, 1f any, simple analytical models seem to attempt portrayal of
3
the relationship between C and combat effectiveness. This report suggests
3
models involving C capabilities and vulnerabilities, and indicates the manner
in which the models suggested may be utilized in a gaming context.
Models constructed in the present manner were proposed by Gaver and Tongue,
(1979). In that study the opposing forces were each split into two groups char-
acterized by their respective information states : those "in the know," or
capable of engaging in efficient attrition activities, and those "in the dark,"
and capable only of less appropriate action, or none at all. It was illustrated
by Tongue (1980) that a capability for quick transition from one information
state to another could sometimes outbalance raw physical capability, such as
firing rate and single-shot kill probability, thus acting as a "force multiplier."
3
Once the potential of the C component is recognized, the latter also
becomes a potential target. It is, therefore, of interest to incorporate the
3
C component explicitly into attrition-type models, and then to exercise the
models so as to expose vulnerabilities and possibly suggest sensible doctrine.
We make a stab at this program here in a highly simplified manner, feeling that
informative elaborations may well be suggested after an initial look. The idea
is to stray in a gingerly fashion into the area between classical Lanchester
combat theory and the extensive and elaborate terrain of the modern wargame.
2. MODELS OF POSITION DEFENSE
2.1. Model I: Defense of a Stronghold (or Bastion or Beachhead)
An initial model for this situation was presented by Gaver and Tongue (1979);
>
see Tongue (1979); henceforth call this the GT Model. Suppose an R-force of size
R attacks a bastion (e.g. beachhead or defended position) held by B. The sig-
nificance is that B is advantageously located, and in GT was assumed to suffer
no casualties initially, while R is exposed and vulnerable and can only succeed
by (a) surprise, or (b) B's inability to critically diminish R before being
overrun. Suppose that R's speed of advance is (nearly) constant, and that R
wins if R(tQ ) >_ kB, where R(tQ ) is R's force size when the stronghold is
reached at time tQ ; k represents R's necessary advantage over B at final
stages or "hand-to-hand" in order to win.
In the GT model, (and here) it was (and is) assumed that B's divide into
two combat groups: one in number B (t), e.g. the number of those able to fire
in an ineffective, specifically unaimed, manner, and another of size B (t),
a
e.g. the number of those capable of firing in a more effective, specifically
aimed way. All sorts of refinements are possible, but for the present two
information states are sufficient.
In GT it was assumed that dynamic transition between BM (t) and B (t)U a
3
occurred: the rate of transition B,,(t) -* B_(t) measured the power of the C
u u
system. However, no attempt was made to represent that system as an explicit
entity, itself being vulnerable and hence an inviting target. In the present
3
model assume that the C assets of B are vulnerable to R, and that the rate
3
of transition from B (t) to B (t) is made possible by the C force B (t); the
u a c
Tatter's effectiveness can in turn be effected by R's actions. In other words, R
can attempt to, or inadvertently, target B (t) -- and only B (t) in the present
model -- using the force R
cc
(t) assigned for that purpose. To the extent that
R
cc
(t), called the Counter-C3 (C-C3 ) Force , is effective, the C3 capability of B,
namely B (t), is reduced by temporary suppression or outright destruction. Such
reduction in turn adversely affects the quality of B's response to R's attack.
Since in this model the effort (in terms of force size) allocated to C-C activity
is removed from the Red active list, thus diminishing R« and hence the number
available to encounter B once the bastion is reached, there is clearly a trade-
3
off opportunity for R. Too large an active force R« at the expense of C-C
,
R„» allows extensive attrition by B on R. free of charge: B (t) may work at
3
full effectiveness. On the other hand, too large a C-C force obviously penal-
izes the attacking force, R
A
. Similar choices exist for B. Only by
setting down a quantitative representation of the combat dynamics and studying
its implications numerically can informed intuition be developed that may lead
to a wise trade-off.
Lanchester-Style Equations
Here are some specific Lanchester-style differential equations that
represent the dynamics described above in words.
3 3










C (BJt), B„(t)) (2.2)dt ua v or ' u
dB„(t)
c
st— <W Bc (t > • "W 1') (2 - 3)
These equations represent the rate of change of the B-force segments with time.
They describe only C
3
-related activities, since physical change (attrition) of
B, and B a has not been allowed in the present scenario. Expression (2.1) states
u a
that the rate of change reduction of the Blue ineffective (unaimed) force depends
3
through the function C A. , .) upon the capacity of the Blue C activity, measured9 ua
by B (t), and upon the number of ineffective forces, B (t), awaiting conversion
to the effective state. Notice that this expression is left general; C ua (. , .)
3
can be specified at will, and must represent the general features of the C
activity, including sensor performance and output analysis as well as communication.














e being a positive constant. This expresses the appealing intuition that the
ua
3
rate of transfer of B, , to B a should increase jointly with the C capability, B. ,
u a (-
and the number available for change, B . On the other hand, (2.1, a) does not
3
reflect processing constraints: if each C -equivalent B - unit can service one














here K represents the conversion factor that allows combat units (e.g. tanks)
to be interchanged for sensor-communication units, or "channels" for short. Other
forms for the conversion rate C may be derived, possibly by modeling this oper-
ational segment in the light of empirical study of any data that happens to be
available.
Together, the two equations (2.1) and (2.2) simply state that a decrease in
B..(t) translates into an increase in B a (t) during the time period (t, t+dt).
u a
For simplicity, there is no attrition of B by R , except for that allowed to
deplete B's C3 capability, B (t).
3
The equation (2.3) states that the rate of decrease of the Blue C force,
3
B r , depends upon the magnitude of Red Counter-C activity, Rrr (t), as well as





(t)) = - •R
cc
(t), (2. 3, a)
4> being a constant. This is a conventional Lanchester aimed-fire model. Another





(t)) - - AWj .. R
cc
(t) (2.3,b)
where BQ is proportional to the area in which B is concentrated, and on which
R concentrates activity. This is essentially an unaimed fire model of classical
Lanchester vintage. There may be reason to transition from (2.3,b) to (2. 3, a)
3
during the course of the engagement, as Information about Blue C increases.
• Blue and Red Physical Attrition.
¥-* - a fRft). B„(t), B,(t)) (2.4)dt cc v cc
dRA
-yf = - aA (RA (t) v Bu (t) » B a (t)) (2 - 5)
The rate functions <* (•) and <*A') represent the physical attrition exacted by
3
R on the two Identified B-force components: the C-C force R , and the active
attacking force R. . It is the magnitude of Rn(tQh i.e. the attack force
survivorship at the time tQ when the bastion is reached, that determines whether
the bastion 1s actually taken. However, the size effectiveness and vulnerability
of R can Indirectly but decisively influence the latter variable and hence
the conflict outcome. The interplay of the variables described by equations
(2.1) - (2.5) quantifies the qualitative system behaviour.




























The first right-hand-side (rhs) term represents the rate of attrition of R by
unaimed B fire; the parameter p rr is composed of both B's fire rate andu ,cc u
single-shot kill probability. The second rhs term represents the rate of
attrition of Rrr by aimed B fire; the parameter p a „_ summarizes the joint
effect of B
fl






expresses the fraction of the aimed fire that is directed at the R force,
where k is a parameter that may be adjusted to account for various combat-
related effects, for example: the relative hardness or invulnerability of the R
force segment as compared to the R« force segment. It also accounts for the
relative exposures of the two forces (R and R
A
) to aimed fire by B
a
. Note
that if k = 1 the probability that a unit of aimed fire will be directed at
the R
cc
element is simply RCC/(RCC + RA ) — the fraction of the existing R
3
force at time t that is devoted to C-C . If k = 0, no aimed shots are
3
directed at the C-C element, instead being concentrated on the attackers, R^ ,
3
while if k -> °° B aimed fire is concentrated on R , the C-C element. In
short, the simple parameter k expresses the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and
priorities of both B and R . It, or a more elaborately developed counterpart,
represents combat decision choice, and would appear to have important influence
on the progress of the combat.






























Again the first rhs term represents the attrition rate component resulting from
the relatively ineffective (unaimed) B fire. The second rhs component repre-
sents the attrition rate from aimed fire by B. The fraction R«/(k R + R
A )
is simply the complement of that appearing in (2. 4, a); it expresses in the simplest
way a composition of the relative vulnerabilities of R components and the
priorities of B.
There appears to be little hope of obtaining insights directly from the
differential equations (2.1) - (2.5). Of course such equations can be solved
numerically, as was done for the GT model by Tongue (1979). But another, some-
what simpler, alternative is to express the functions directly in discrete time,
taking the time steps to be of unit size; perhaps 0.25 hr. might be appropriate
for a start.
Lanchester-Style Equations in Discrete Time
3 3





































These are easily seen to be the counterparts of (2.1) - (2.3). They may be
solved recursively, starting with the initial conditions specified by
B,,(0), B (0), and BJO). Choice of the initial condition by B constitutes a
u a c




leaving B (0) = 80 and B (0) = implies more faith by B in his C capabilities
u a
and invulnerability than does the choice B
c
(0) = 50 leaving B
u
(0) = 50 with B
fl
(0) = 0.
The same considerations hold true for R also.
7
• Red's Physical Attrition
R
cc






















Here again one starts with initial conditions R
cc
(0) and RA (0) and solves
recursively to find the Red attacker force size at tQ , when the defended position
3
is reached. If R has considerable faith in the unit effectiveness of its C-C ,
then presumably Rrr (0) is chosen to be relatively small, permitting the majorityMM
of its resources to be allocated to the attack force R«(0).
3. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS OF MODEL I PERFORMANCE
The present version of Model I is as simple as seems consistent with our
attempts to blend elements of Command and Control with combat interactions
between forces. Even so five state variables are needed to describe system be-
havior, and their inter-related evolution in time is sufficiently complex to
make a direct mathematical discussion appear unprofitable. As an alternative
we have elected to create a computer program that produces the numerical se-
quences of values assumed by the various forces as combat progresses.
The computer program is written in FORTRAN; a listing appears in an Appendix.
If combat is terminated at a particular time point, tQ , the relation-
ship of Rfl(t) to B.(t) will be assumed to determine the outcome. The
latter relationship is itself influenced by decision variables on each side.
Here are some options and constraints for the combatants.
• Initial Red attacker force size, R(0) , and its division
3 3








• Initial Blue defender force size, B(0), and its disposition














Often, B (0) <- will be reasonable as an initial condition; this would
a
represent surprise by the Red force.
3
Note that Blue has a technological constraint that limits its C




the rate per unit time of acquisition and transfer, and thus of converting
B 's into B 's, and (ii) K, the capacity factor according to which force
u a
3
units (B (t) = tank equivalents, say) are made equivalent to C units
(sensor-communication combinations or "channels" for short); see (2.1,b) for
the rate expression actually used. Initially imagine Blue to be merely en-
dowed with these parameters, and allow them to remain fixed. It may be rea-
sonable for them to change as combat progresses and sensors are disabled,
etc. The current computer program can be straightforwardly altered to reflect
such combat related damage or degradation.
Blue is assumed to be in possession of the decision parameter, k,
see (2. 4, a) and (2. 5, a): increases in k directs a greater proportion of
B ,'s fire at R forces, while reduction of k concentrates B a fire ata cc a
the Red attacking force, R«; k = means exclusive concentration on R« .
Although the present model explicitly makes k a constant throughout the
combat period, no such restriction need be at all permanent: it may perhaps
be best for B to switch from k = °° at early stages of combat — thus
maximally reducing R
cc
's interference with initial rapid buildup of the
B 's force — finally switching to k = later on so as to concentrate on
a
decimating the R. force before the defended position is reached. If for
example, B (t) is (i) hardly reduced at all after a few periods, or
(ii) is almost wiped out, then there would seem to be little reason for B
to target R units any longer. Of course if B forces are almost
entirely converted to B 's there would again seem to be little reason to
a
target R , for B 's function has been accomplished — at least so far as
WW w
the current engagement is concerned.
Switching betwen two extreme values of k is reminiscent of the "bang-
bang" policies of control "optimal," but there is no measure of effectiveness
or figure of merit yet specified for B.
10
Numerical Cases
Here are the parameter values selected for initial exercise of the model
R
A (0)
= 120 , R
cc
(0) = 30
<j>, (attrition rate of B by R ) , = 1 .
B
a
(0) = , B
u









For simplicity we are assuming that the Unaffective Blues have no combat per-
formance capability, but are merely a pool of assets from which Effectives are
3
created by the information from the central C facility. This assumption
can easily be modified if desired.
Note carefully that in all that follows the numerical values for various
parameters have been chosen for illustrative purposes only, and need bear no
close resemblance to any actual values, which are in fact unknown to us. The
purposes of the cases discussed is entirely exploratory. But of course we hope
that that the suggestions and implications noted will promote interest in
further work, leading to model refinements and the use of more nearly correct
parameter values, if such can be agreed upon.
11
l^-L -- p a,cc = 1 -° • p aA =1 -° (Blue Attrition rates)
<j> = 1.0 (Red Attrition rate on Blue C )

















1 (-) M 00 00
2 6.0 6.00 3.0 3.0
3 2.97 3.27 1.20 1.50
4 1.57 2.12 0.21 0.60
5 0.56 1.07 0.00 0.00
6 0.00 .06
7 0.00
8 > t 1 4* y
Red/Blue Active Force Ratio as Combat Progresses
(Red C-C 3 Attrition Rate * = 1.0)
Fig. 3.1
The numbers in the above figure suggest that
t Increasing the speed e
,
(reducing the response time) of Blue C
activity has a profound effect upon the Red/Blue Force Ratio:
e.g. at t = 4 when k = (Blues concentrated on Red 3
Attackers) Reds outnumber Blues by 1.6 to 1 if Blue's C
speed is e
ua
1, while doubling that rate to e
ua
= 2 under
otherwise the same circumstances cuts the ratio to a Blue-
favorable 0.21 to 1, i.e. by a factor of about eight.
• For the parameters considered, concentration by Blue on Red
Attack forces pays off more than does concentration on the
Red C-C 3 : e.g. at t = 4 with Rapid Blue C 3 the advantage to
Red changes from a force ratio of 1.6 to 2.1 with an increased
concentration of fire by Blue on Red's C-C 3 .
12
The comparative advantage of Red to Blue (R.(t)/B
a
(t), yielded
by Blue emphasis on Red Attackers (k = 0.2) instead of Blue
3 3
emphasis on Red C-C (k = 5} diminishes as Blue C speed e
ua
decreases. The reason may be that when the crucial
Blue C^ function is relatively weak or slow, it is profitable
to spend more effort n its defense, at least until it has
served its assigned purpose of converting B. 's to B 's .
u a
Case 2 : PdjCC (t) = 0.25 + 0.075t = p aA (t)
* = 1.0
In this case a space (and hence time) varying representation of the attrition
rate is introduced: at t = when the Red force is far away, attrition
rates on it are taken to be low, but they increase steadily with decreasing
range (increasing t).
Medium-Speed Blue C 3 Rapid Blue C 3
Attack
3
c-r Attack C-C 3













1 00 00 oo 00
2 6.0 6.00 3.00 3.00
3 3.35 3.44 1.58 1.60
4 2.25 2.50 0.88 1.12
5 1.37 1.82 0.23 0.60
6 0.40 0.89 0.00 0.00
7 0.00 0.00 A vt
Red/Blue Active Force Ratio as Combat Progresses
(Red C-C 3 Attrition Rate <j> = 1.0)
Fig. 3.2
13
There is little qualitative change in the numbers obtained, as compared to
those of Fig. 3.1. The change in the attrition rate function, increasing from
a small to a larger value as time goes on, allows a larger number of Reds to
survive longer than was true for Case 1. Again it seems profitable for Blue
to expend most of its energy on Red Attackers.







<j) = 1.0 (Red Attrition Rate vs_ Blue C 3 )
r
e na
= 0.5 (Relatively Slow Blue C 3 )
i
ua
= 1.0 (Relatively Rapid Blue C 3 )
In order to describe the results the entire computer printout is now presented.
Parameter values are shown across the page top; note that KC (computer
printout) = k (text); the larger (smaller) this parameter becomes the greater
(less) is concentration of Blue fire on Red C-C .
• Compare cases for which e,, a = 0.5 to e iia = 1.0: the forceua ua
nation RA /B a for the slower system (e M _ = 0.5) is about twicem a ua
that for the faster (e„ a = 1.0) system, no matter whichua
firing strategy is adopted (k = 0.2, 5, or 10).
• The time period during which Ra/B is above unity (Reds
have advantage), or there is near parity, is about 15 to 16
3
for e, a = 0.5 (Relatively Slow Blue C ); the same period isua
about 8 to 9 for e,,., = 1.00. After that period the R
flua r\
force is quickly wiped out, but there are wide differences
in the readiness of the B 's : for k = KC = 5, 10 the B 's
a
soon reach their maximum of 80, (t ~ 12), while at
k = KC = 0.2 the maximum is not reached until t ~ 42.
14
30.00 0.00 13.33 66.67 .00 0.00
K KC RHOUC RHOUA RHOAA RHOAC PHI H TIIUA S
1. 000 .200 0.000 0.000 .250 .250 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000
RCC(T) RA(T) FU< T) BA(T) BC(T) 1WBU+BA RA/BA
J
30.00 120.00 80.00 0.00 20.00 1.50 -1.00
30.00 120.00 60.00 20.00 14.00 1.50 6.00
3 29.76 115.24 46.00 34.00 9.80 1.44 3.39
4 29.34 107.16 36.20 43.80 6.88 1.34 2.45
5 28.78 96.77 29.32 50.68 4.86 1.21 1.91
6 28.06 84.81 24.45 55.55 3.46 1.06 1.53
7 27.20 71.79 20.99 59.01 2.49 .90 1.22
8 26.16 58.08 U 18.50 61.50 1.81 .73 .94
y 54 .8y li.y/
29.75
16. 6H 64.^ 1.34 d:j 6V
10 23.28 15.34 64.66 1.01 .37 .46
11 21.10 15.78 14.34 65.66 .77 .20 .24
12 17.63 2.82 13.57 66.43 .61 .04 .04
13 8.41 0.00 12.96 67.04 .50 0.00 0.00
14 0.00 0.00 12.46 67.54 .46 0.00 0.00
15 0.00 0.00 12.00 68.00 .46 0.00 0.00
16 0.00 0.00 11.54 68.46 .46 0.00 0.00
17 0.00 0.00 11.08
10.62
68.92 .46 0.00 0.00
18 0.00 0.00 69.38 .46 0.00 0.00
19 0.00 0.00 10.16 69.84 .46 0.00 0.00
20 0.00 0.00 9.70 70.30 .46 0.00 0.00
21 0.00 0.00 9.24 70.76 .46 0.00 0.00
22 0.00 0.00 8.78 71.22 .46 0.00 0.00
23 0.00 0.00 8.32 71.68 .46 0.00 0.00
3 0.00 0.00 7.86 72.14 .46 0.00 0.000.00 0.00 7.40 72.60 .46 0,00 0.00
26 0.00 0.00 6.94 73.06 .46 0.00 0.00
27 0.00 0.00 6.48 73.52 .46 0.00 0.00
28 0.00 0.00 6.02 73.98 .46 0.00 0.00
29 0.00 0.00 5.56 74.44 .46 0.00 0.00
30 0.00 0.00 5.11 74.89 .46 0.00 0.00
31 0.00 0.00 4.65 75.35 .46 0.00 0.00
32 0.00 0.00 4.19
3.73
75.81 46 0.00 0.00
33 0.00 0.00 76.27 .46 0.00 0.00
34 0.00 0.00 3.27 76.73 .46 0.00 0.00
35 0.00 0.00 2.81 77.19 46 0.00 0.00
36 0.00 0.00 2.35 77.65 46 0.00 0.00
37 0.00 0.00 1.89 78.11 .46 0.00 0.00
38 0.00 0.00 1.43 78.57 46 0.00 0.00
39 0.00 0.00 .97 79.03 46 0.00 0.00
40 0.00 0.00 .51 79.49 46 0.00 0.00
41 0.00 0.00 .05 79.95 .46 0.00 0.00
42 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.00 .46 0.00 0.00
43 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.00 .46 0.00 0.00
44 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.00 46 0.00 0.00
45 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.00 46 0.00 0.00
46 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.00 .46 0.00 0.00
Red/Blue Force Changes as Combat Progresses t<i>=1.0)
(K= KC = 0.2)
Fig. 3.3a
15
47 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.
K KC RHOUC RHOUA RHOAA RHOAC PHI H THUA S
1* 000 5.000 0.000 0.000 .250 .250 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000
RCC( T ) RA(T) BU<T>
80.00
BA<T) BC< T ) RA/BIH BA RA/BA
1 30.00 120.00 0.00 20.00 1.50 - 1 00
2 30.00 120.00 60.00 20.00 14.00 1.50 6.00
3 27.22 117.78 46.00 34.00 9.80 1.47 3.46
4 22*67 113.83 36,20 43.80 7.13 1.42 2.60
5 17.20
11.57
108.35 29.07 50.93 5.52 1.35 2.13
6 101.25 23.55 56.45 4.57 1.27 1.79
7 6.44 92.27 18.99 61.01- 4.04 1.15 1.51
f-
—*&-
-HtSf •-HtB- 65.0568. Hi 3.784.68 1.0184 1.24T77-
10 0.00 50.06 7.48 72.52 3.67 .63 69
11 0.00 31.93 3.81 76.19 3.67 .40 42
0.00 12.89 14 79.86 3.67 16 .16
13 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.00 3.67 0.00 0.00
14 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.00 3.67 0.00 0.00
15 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.00 3.67 0.00 0.00
i*
0.00 0.00 0.00 80.00 3.67 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 80.00 3.67 0.00 0.00
18 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.00 3.67 0.00 0.00




K KC RHOUC RHOUA RHOAA RHOAC PHI
1.000
H THUA







BA(T) BC(T) 1*A/BU+BA RA/BA
1
0.00 20.00 1.50 - 1 00
30.00 120.00 60.00 20.00 14.00
9.80
1.50 6.00





36.20 43.80 7.21 1.45 2.65
13.56 28.99 51.01 5.73 1.40 2.20
6 6.58 23.26 56.74 4.95 1.33 1.37
7 1.15 97.46 18.31 61.69 4.63 1.22 1.58
?
0.00 83.67 13.69 66.31 4.57 1.05 1.26
0.00 67.09 9.11 70.89 4.57 .84 .95
10 0.00 49.37 4.54 75.46 4.57 .62 65
11 0.00 30.50 0.00 80.00 4.57 .38 .38




0.00 80.00 4.57 0.00 0.00
14 0.00 80.00 4.57 0.00 0.00
15 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.00 4.57 0.00 0.00
I 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.00 4.57 0.00 0.00
17 0.00
0.00 8:88 8:88
80.00 4.57 0.00 0.00
18 80.00 4.57 0.00 0.00
19 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.00 4.57 0.00 0.00
20 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.00 4.57 0.00 0.00
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.00 4.57 0.00 0.000.00 0.00 0.00 80.00 4.57 0.00 0.00
23 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.00 4.57 0.00 0.00
24 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.00 4.57 0.00 0.00
25 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.00 4.57 0.00 0.00
26 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.00 4.57 0.00 0.00
27 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.00 4.57 0.00 0.00
28 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.00 4.57 0.00 0.00
29 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.00 4.57 0.00 0.00
30 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.00 4.57 0.00 0.00




0.00 80.00 4.57 0.00 0.00
33 0.00 0.00 80.00 4.57
4.57
0.00 0.00
34 0.00 0.00 80.00 0.00 0.00














AH), B c (0)=10 B U (0)=80(=BA (»)), B c (0)=20 B u (0) =60(=BAH), B c (0
It k: 10 10 10
1 48.0 48.0 24.0 24.0 12.0 12.0
2 24.7 24.7 12.3 12.4 6.1 6.2
3 16.9 17.0 8.4 8.5 4.2 4.2
4 13.0 13.1 6.4 6.5 3.2 3.3
5 10.6 10.8 5.2 5.4 2.6 2.8
10 5.74 6.05 2.62 2.92 1.54 1.92
15 3.95 4.39 1.57 1.95 0.97 1.47
20 2.91 3.43 0.88 1.22 0.46 0.97
30 1.52 1.96 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00
40 0.44 0.71 i 0.00 I Jr
Red/Blue Active Force Ratio as Combat Progresses
Fig. 3.4
The most striking effect visible in the table is that Blue improves his
performance relative to Red by decreasing the Effectives and increasing
the allocation of his forces to C . A nearly 3-to-l improvement (for B) of the
force ratio at t = 5 is apparent. The effect of the parameter k, which
dictates the fraction of B energy expended to deplete Red C-C , is yery small
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4. A STOCHASTIC VERSION OF MODEL I
The evolutionary equations (2.1) - (2.5), or equivalently (2.6) - (2.10)
are entirely deterministic, a feature that seems unrealistic since in reality
uncertainty and random variability abound. There are several ways in which
uncertainty may be allowed to intrude into the formulations; for instance
(i) Through the necessity of estimating parameters
(p.. , p __, k, etc . ) from data, assuming the model specification
is "correct", or at least adequate.
(ii) Through the necessity of using simplistic models such as
(2.1) - (2.5) to represent a more complex reality.
(iii) By explicitly permitting randomness to enter the dynamic equations
as an additional driving force.
(iv) Other possibilities; combinations of the above, for example.
Begin by adding a random perturbation term to the discrete time equations






V»> - Cua(£c (t
" V l > + cm(h (t















t). V*)- V*>) + cc(A*W cc))
«„(*)• V* 1) + °aK+i (A))
The notation )( denotes a random function. The vector of random components
JL(u), jMa), J^(c), ^(cc), J^(A) will be taken to be one of not necessarily
independent Wiener processes, sampled at time points t = 1, 2, 3, Thus
the equations (4.1 ) turn out to be analogous to Ito-type stochastic differential
equations; such equations have been used by Lehoczky and Perla ( 1978) to describe
combat situations.
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4.1. Explicit Representation of Random Terms .
By arguments analogous to those of Lehoczky and Perl a ( 1978), or of Gaver
and Lehoczky ( 1977) in a different context, we write down expressions for the
scales a(») of the random components written as a. /AW
t+1 (•)) in (4.1).
We argue heuristically that if the stochastic processes are nearly Markovian and
further are superpositions of many point (e.g. birth-death) processes describing
the changes of individuals states in a relatively short time period, then it is
reasonable that a(«) be equal to the square-root of the individual drift
(deterministic) terms, the latter being given by the expression
C
ua(&c (t) ' V 1^)' Ccc(&cc (t) ' V t} ' &a {t))' etc ' a PPearin 9 on the rhs of U-D-
The latter is suggested by the approximately Poisson nature of the changes
in state of the system over relatively short time intervals. Recall that the
standard deviation of a Poisson random variable (state change, here) is equal
to the square-root of the mean (state change), or drift in diffusion theory jargon,




-j(a), etc ., are realizations of
independent unit normal or Gaussian random variables. Some readers will recognize
the resulting system to be a discrete-time version of Ito-type stochastic
differential equations; see Arnold ( ) for basic information.
Here are some explicit examples, following (2.1,b), (2.3), (2. 4, a), (2. 5, a).
V(AW U) ) = [ve ua«1nJKBc lt). Bu (t)|](aW t+1 (u))




(a) ~N(0,1), i.e. has the Normal distribution with mean 0,








the latter because a fluctuation away from the mean change in one di recti on--down,
say— for B
u
(t) is exactly matched by one in the up direction for B (t) during time
interval t to t+1 . Next, using (2.3,b),
vK+i (c 4v*{^) rcc^jJK+i^)) (4.3)
where AW
t+1
(c) ~N(0,1), and AW
t+1
(c) is independent of AW
t+
,(a) as well as



















,(cc,a) are independent random elements, both ~ N(0,1 ),
that represent respectively the fluctuation away from mean attrition on the Red C-C*
facility caused by unaimed (ineffective) fire and by aimed (effective) fire.
Finally, use of (2.5a) provides













,(a,A) are independent and normally distributed, rep-
resenting fluctuations around mean attrition on the R
A
- component. Under the
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present simple circumstances in which approximate independence may be justified,












































This will reduce simulation difficulties by making it unnecessary to sample two
normal random variables for each of the last equations. The introduction of
correlation is easy, if justified.
It might be pointed out that considerable freedom exists in the choice of
the distribution of all of the noise terms aW.
+
-.(0: they need not be normal,
nor need they be independent, nor, in fact, need they be independent of the cor-
responding state value. Of course a random fluctuation that sends, say, J^(17)
formally negative must in truth merely wipe out the A-force, i.e. reduce it to
zero. Intuition indicates that a formal (and forbidden) passage below zero for
J^(t+1), and that the latter is unlikely to be extensive by virtue of the small
noise variation near £« = for the particular form of (4.5,b). However, choice
of a more gaudily variable noise increment, e.g. with aw" ,(•) now chosen to be
long tailed, perhaps in a Cauchy-like manner, will likely require more extensive
fixing at the boundary. This is no reason to avoid such models, for there is
nothing holy about the normal (or Wiener-like) variation save for its appearance
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as the noise when a basic Markov structure is assumed to underlie the present
models. Actually, over-variation (from the Gaussian/normal) and serial
dependence may well usefully represent mixtures of normals (or other) dis-
tributions resulting from factors such as terrain, visibility, and many other
features which combine to generate departures from the systematic determin-
istic models analogous to the classical Lanchester forms (2.1) - (2.5).
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5. MODEL II: TWO FORCES IN COMBAT WITH MUTUAL ATTRITION
The model described earlier dealt with a special situation in which one force
(Red) was the attacker of another in a defended position (Blue). Lack of symmetry
was evident. The model of this section represents an equally stylized but now
symmetric situation in which both forces are capable of causing attrition on each
other. Once again, guidance is furnished by explicitly represented, and vulnerable
3
C agencies. Our models allow for different targetting strategies.
Notation is as follows:
R (t) = the number of active Reds at t, meaning the number of R's
actually targetted on, and firing at, Blue units.
B
fl
(t) = the corresponding Blue force size.
R. (t) = the number of ineffective (or inactive ) R's at t, meaning
the number of R's currently untargetted and awaiting new
assignment.
B. (t) = the corresponding Blue force size.
R
c
(t) = the size of the Red C agency at t, i.e. the force responsible
for switching R. - units to R a - units.
1 a
B (t) = the corresponding Blue force size.
The quantities R (t) and B (t) are to be viewed as the command and control
authorities responsible for the individual direct combat elements on their respecti
sides. The state variables Ra (t), R. (t), B a (t), B_-(t) may be thought of ina i a i
units of individual tanks or ships, or as aggregations such as battalions, companie
naval task groups, or whatever is appropriate for the particular situation under
consideration. The intention of the present model is to simply express changes
in the respective force sizes in terms of rate processes— both information transfer
rates and physical attrition rates--and in terms of initial allocations of resource
It is clear that when Red and Blue forces come into contact a variety of pos-
sible behaviors may occur. The models developed here are intended to represent the
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consequences of a few simplified versions of the true complexity possible. In
particular, they permit the study of different target category priority schemes.
Red(Blue) Force State Equations
The general form of the state change equations now follows. They are
given only for Red, but the Blue equations are symmetric.
R
a
(t+1) = R*(t) - C
BRA




















Effect of Information State Change, R












Physical Attrition, R. (5.2)
+ D
RJ
(R*(t), R*(t), R*(t), B*(t), B*(t), B*(t))
Effect of Information State Change, R.
R
c
(t+1) = R*(t) - C
BRC
(R*(t), R*(t), R*(t), B*(t))
3
Red C Capacity Attrition and Suppression (5.3)
+ D
RC





Red C Capacity Restoration and Recovery
* * *
• Additionally, to compute R . R
.
, R„ from R a , R . , R„, utilize the appro-a i c a i c
priate physical constraints:
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R*(t+1) = minHyO) + R.(0), max{R
a
(t+l), 0}]






• Initial conditions, i.e. values of R_(0), R, (0), R„(0), are required to
a l C




(arguments as in (5.1)) = cbra^^
D
RA

































There now follow some specific expression for the above rates, intended to
illustrate possible effort allocation strategies.
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A. Greedy Allocation (Blue vs_. Red)






B(R a (t)) = Number of Blue Actives vs. Red Activesa ~~
~
= min[B*(t), R*(t)]
• Note that all B 's fire one-on-one onlR 's if
a a
B a force < R, force; otherwise one-on-one until R targets
a a a
• •
are insufficient, leaving B a (t) - R a (t) to be used againsta a
R. 's, which are next on the priority list.
b) C
BRI
(t) = P j B(R*(t)),
*
B( Rt (t) ) = Number of Blue Actives vs.- Red Inactives









(t)) = Number of Blue Actives vs^. Red C
= minrmax{B
a
(t) - B(R*(t)) - B(R*(t)), 0}, R*(t)J
• Change of priority is easily accomplished: if priority
sequence is






B(R*(t)), B(R*(t)) = min B*(t), R*(t)
C
BRy
(t) = B(R*(t)), B(R*(t)) = minLx)B*(t) - B(R*(t)), 0|,
V 1 5.7)
W** = B(R*(t)). B(R*(t)) = m1nfmax)B*(t) - B(R*(t)) - B(R*(t)), 0(,
R*(t)
• Same, with obvious changes, for Red on Blue
• Attrition rates of Blue, by Red, are denoted respectively by e , B . , e_.
a c
• Attrition rates can be made time (space) dependent.
• Note that the attrition law is assumed for illustration only to be
in accordance with a Lanchesterian linear law. Other types of laws
can clearly replace this one.





















• k«, kr, k
c
are control "constants", representing target priorities
They can be changed or combat progresses, if desired. If k« | °°
(practically k./kj ~ k./kp ~ 10 should do) there is heavy emphasis
on R 's
a
• P « is attrition rate (firing rate times single-shot kill probability).







































• Same for Red on Blue with appropriate notational changes.
• This is an alternative strategy that allocates some B -effort to
a
all components of the Red force. It samples rather than gulps.
There are many possible alternatives.
Red(Blue) Information State Change Equations
Here are some sample equations that are tentatively proposed to model
the effects of philosophy and capability of the C component.
(1) Tight Central Control (Reds) ; C Attrition
Only R _'s may fire at Blues. When a Red firing engagement
a
terminates, it returns to the R. status (becomes inactive). The
















(R. -»- R a rate; C process)a




URBP W ' WRBC
v r
->
(Number of Red y_s_ Blue Engagements Terminated
in t
t











(t) = °* ( No Red c recovery from suppression.) (5.13)
Note that in this model both physical attrition (which is permanent)
and lack of information (temporary, unless C is inadequate) reduce
Red effectiveness.
(2) Loose Central Control; C Attrition



















• Note that this model assumes that once an R. changes to R.
1 c
status it remains so until physically removed.
• A model that lies between (1) and (2) may be attractive, in which
case one might multiply the second term in (5.11) by a time (distance)
dependent factor less than unity to represent the fraction of the
2
terminating Red engagements that must have recourse to central C
re-direction.
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6. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS OF MODEL II PERFORMANCE .
In this section we present some examples of Model II behavior. Once again
these numerical results are obtained from a computer program written in FORTRAN;
a listing appears in an Appendix. The intention is to provide some feeling for
the sensitivity of the model to changes in parameters and combat philosophy or
priorities. Careful study of the outcomes will be helpful in leading one to
comprehend the complex dynamics of this model and others evolving from it.
Discussion . For convenience, consider the columns in the Figure labelled 1 •*- 9
from the left; e.g. Col. 3 is headed c
R
=l,(2), under p =0.1, meaning that
2
Red's C rate is unity, the attrition rate of Blue on Red is p =0.1, and (1)
Strong Central Control is in use by both antagonists.
?
• Each combatant's Active component first grows, as C changes Inactive
to Actives, and then dwindles by attrition. This is to be expected.
2
• Compute Col. 2 and Col. 3: Strong Central Control tends to overload C
to the detriment of Red Actives. See also Col. 6 and Col. 7: same lesson
for Blue Actives. A tradeoff would occur if S.C.C. by Red was combined
with higher attrition rates for Red than Blue, Blue using L.C.C.
• Compare Col. 2 and Col. 4: increasing (doubling) C processing rate
under S.C.C. provides a decided initial improvement for Red. but this
disappears later; the number of Inactives becomes small, so there are no































1 20 20 40 40 10 10 10 10
2 37 39 75 79 18 19 18 19
3 52 57 90 97 24 27 24 27
4 75 91 83 91 34 41 34 41
6 81 87 81 87 37 47 37 47
7 77 82 77 82 40 52 40 52
8 73 77 73 77 42 57 42 57
9 69 71 69 71 43 61 44 61
10 65 65 65 65 45 65 45 65
15 44 38 44 38 48 64 48 52
20 26 23 26 23 44 48 32 36
25 16 13 16 13 35 38 21 26
Col:







Priorities ; Actives - Inactives - C
(1): Strong Central Control
(2): Loose Central Control
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2
Discussion . This Fig. 6.2 illustrates the effect of changes in target priority
under different philosophies of central control.
• All else being equal, S.C.C., indicated by (1), is a handicap as illus-
trated by comparison of Col. 2 and 4 for Reds, and corresponding Cols. 6
and 8 for Blues. The penalty for Blue is higher possibly because of its
2
original smaller complement of C assets, and hence its poorer traffic
handling capability.
2
• Suppose Blue reverses firing priority, targetting C first, then R
,
a
finally R.. Compare Cols. (3) and (7) to Cols. (2) and (6). Note that
2
initially R, actually improves when C is first priority because R a
a a
is only lightly diminished and R remains temporarily adequate. It
2
appears that this strategy change by B is ineffective because Red's C
facilities are ample enough to withstand the attack.
2
• Suppose Red reverses firing strategy, targetting Blue C first, then B ,
and finally R. . Adopt loose control, (2), for illustration. Note that
2
the effect on B a of Reds C -first strategy is initially small, but as
a
the combat proceeds B a force size is considerably reduced.a
2
The last two comparisons suggest that primary attach on the opponent's C
force is advantageous when that force is meager (or especially vulnerable), while
2
such an attack is actually counterproductive in case the C force is adequate.
Of course this simply suggests that high priority is best placed on attacking
the weakest point in the system. In the present example weakness is merely a
matter of numbers (C force size), whereas in reality there must be an assessment
of a potential target's capability or performance rate. Models of the present type,
and their offspring and siblings, should be of use for evaluating different pro-
posed targetting strategies or doctrine.
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1 20 20 20 20 10 10 10 10
2 37 38 39 39 18 18 19 19
3 52 53 57 57 24 24 27 26
4 64 64 74 75 30 30 34 32
5 75 72 91 91 34 34 41 36
6 81 77 87 88 37 37 47 39
7 77 79 82 84 40 40 52 41
8 73 80 77 80 72 72 57 42
9 69 79 71 76 43 43 61 43
10 65 76 65 71 45 45 65 43
15 44 55 39 51 48 48 64 38
20 26 33 23 33 33 33 48 30
25 16 19 13 20 21 21 38 22
Col:












Cases: Cols. 2 & 6
Cols. 3 & 7
Cols. 4 & 8
Cols. 5 & 9
(1): Strong Central Control
(2): Loose Central Control
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PROGRAM LISTING MODEL I
(DETERMINISTIC & STOCHASTIC)
: RwAR FORTRAN A NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
REAL BUI 100) ,BAI 100) ,8C(100) ,RCC( 100),RA(lOO) RWA00010
REAL KC ,K,H, THUA.PHI ,BO,RO ,RHUUC,RHuAC RWA00020
INTEGER T,ro RWA00030
REAL*8 TlTLb(3 t 2) RWA00040
DATA TITLE/'OETEK^lIM' ,'ISTIC C3', 1 MODEL • , • S TOCHAST • , I C C3 MO'.RWAOOOW
X «DEL'/ RWA00U60
DATA IX/123456/, IP/0/ RWA00070
,













READtb,122) K , KC , R-IGAA , RH3 AC , S ,THU A , PHI , I TYPE R*A00210
IFIK .LT. 0.) STU? RWA00220
RWA00230





WRlTHo, L23) (Tl TlJI I , ITYPE) ,1=1,3) RWA00253
WRITE(6,100) RWA00263
RO=RCC.( i) * <A( I ) RWAJ02 7J
BO=BA( 1 ) *BU( 1 JfBCd ) RWA002dO
BUAO=BA( 1) + 3U( 1) R«A,)OZid
RW A 003 00




IF(BUIT)+3A(T) .M£. 0.) Rl=RAIT)/( BUIT)+OA(T) ) RWA00330
R2=-l. RWA00340
IF( BAIT) .ME. 0. ) R2=RA(T)/3AI T) RWA003<>0
R3=-l. RWA003oO
IF(RAIl) .HE. 0.) P3=(RA< TJ-RAI 1) )/RA( 1) RWA00370
R4=-i. RWA003 80
I F ( T .GT. 1 .AJO. KAITJ.JE. 0.) Iw= (I A ( T ) -RAI T-l ) ) /RAI T- 1 ) RWA00390
I T 1 = T- 1 RWA00400
WRITE (6, 10 1) 11 1 , RCC( T) , RA( T ) ,BOlT ) , BA( T ), iiC I T ) ,RL, R2,33,R4 RW A 00410
RWA00420
CUAN=CUA< oC( T) , .. J( T J , TrlJu .!() RWA00430
RCUA=iQ;<nC'i \l) * GAUSS I U , I P , t TYPE ) RWA00440
BU(T+l)-A.'.AXU 3U( D -CJAN-klJAi 1.1 RWA00450
BAIT + l ) sA.4l.Nl IBA( T) frCJAfH RCJA t liUAO) RWA00460
RWA00470
CC=CCCIRCC( T) ,PnI ,mC( T) ,j J) RWAOO^BO
BC{ T+l ) =A,-1AXll BCiD- it S j<flCL)*GAUSSI IX, IP, I TYPE) , 0. ) Rw A 00490
RWA00500
CALL ALCCIRCCIT ) , JUI I ) ,0A IT) ,-:-i;)JC, RHOaC,ka( I ) ,RO,KC, ACi,AC2) RWA00510
RCCITU )=A 4AXI ( RCC(T)-{ ACl + Ai.2) « RWA00520
X SJRTI ACUAC2) *GAJSSUX, IP, I TYPE ) , J. ) RWA00530
RWA00540
CALL ALA! \\{ T) , bJ( T ), u\( N ,KCC(T ) ,RHUJA,KJ, RHJAA,*C , \Li,AL2) RWAC0550
FILE: RWAR FORTRAN A NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
RA(TUI*AMA*l( HAITI « I4UHU] .„
10 CO5 GO
FO
SQkf ( ALltAL2]*GAU$S(U, IP.JTYPEI , Q. )
CTtH-R^ITi.LT. .Ol .AND. RCCTfU J-tfCCiT I .L£ . .ol .AND.
' JUl-301 TI.LT. .01 I 30 TO 15
IflRAi
• AN J
RMAT!/' RCC(T) R A C T J BU(T) a A< T
I
BCUM,




• H THJA S«i/10F7.J»










IF(RCC ,LT. .00001 .OR. KC ,LT. .OOOOOU GQ















CUA-AMIN1 ( THUA*K*dt iTHUA*riJ f BU)
RETURN
END




FUNCTJ-..M ..AUSiliX ,jp, ITYPE I
REAL A ( I ) JO |
GAUSS=J.
IF ( J TYr»E .c«g, I) RETURN





FILE: RWAR FORTRAN NAVAL PQSTGRAOUATE SCHOOL




PROGMH LISTING MODEL II (DETERMINISTIC)
I WACT FORTRAN A NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHUJL
REAL ROtlOOl »d(3flOO| |DRA,DUA WACOOOIO
REAL KK,KB, RU<3J » U EI { 3 J t C BR ( 3 ) ,CRR ( 3) WAC00020
INTEGER NA.MEI3I/ «A a f 'I'-t'C'/ WAC0O03O
INTEGER [|TJtVkC3)tVBI3lf PR(3) f PB(3) • *AC30O«*0
REAL*8 TI TLE (3) .iACOOO'jO
DATA TITLE/PRIORITY' ,» TARGETT* i • L\) MODEL'/ WACOJG*>0
OATA lX/1234:>6/ f IP/O/ WAC00070
. GAVER COMBAT HOUEL PRIORITY TARCETTED WACOOOnO
R(l,i)*0. wACJOO^O
R2t 11=100. WAC0O1C0
R(3 f l)=20. M'ACJOUt)
B(lil)=0. WACOOU'O
8(2,U = 1S0. *AC00130
Bj3tll = i0. HAC00140
VR(J),I-lt3 ARE PRIORITIES FOR A,1,C RESPE. SAME: FUR \M{ I ) *AC00150
VR(lj=l vjACOJlCO
VR(2)=2 *ACJul70





'.•' AC 002 30
CONTINUE *AC0J240
WRITE(6,12i) sAC.00250
READ<5,122) KR, KB ,CR t CB , (RO(J) ,0E { I ) , I = 1 ,3 ) VAC0026)
IF(KR .LT. 0.) STOP ,%ACjj273
DO 6 1 = 1,3 ' WAC 002<VJ
PR(VK(lh = i \ aAC002^J
CRB(I)a-l. *AC0031UPB|VB( I||*I WAC0030J
CBR(I)»-tl ,mAC00320
CONTINUE WAC00330








WRITE(6,lll) KRi KB.CR.CB. (RO(I ),BE( I ), 1 = 1, J) WAC00390
WRITE it>, 127 (NAME) VB I) ) ,1 =1,3) ,
I
NAME( y <( I) ) , 1 = 1, J) *AC0J400
WRITE 6tl23i IT ITLEC II »I*I 1 3) ^ACjij410
WRITE(6,10QJ ,jAC 30420
wAC 30430
DO 10 T«l f TO ,'ACOOVk)
IT1=T-1 * AC 00450
WRITE(6,10l) ITlt(R(I ,T) i I = lt 3) ,(H( i,T) ,1=1 o ) , *AC00*6U
X (CBR{ I) ,1 = 1 ,3) , (CRBi J ),I=L,3) ,ORA,OOA ..'ACJ0470
CRB(U = AM1M( 8(P0(i),T), K(1,T) ) .! AC 00400
CRB(2)=AMAX1 0. , AMINUBI PH(2 ),T) ,K(i, r )-i..s i( 1) ) ) ,.AL 0)500
CRB(3)=AiAXl(0. , AMINllBIPOI3),T),K|L t T)-„KMll-Mi|,|| j «ACJd51J
,,AC00520
CBR(1)=AMIN1( R<PR(1),T), b{i,D J .AC0JS3U
CBR(2)=AMAXitO. , AMINUK (PK(2),T) ,b( 1 t T )-Ui <( I) ) ) i*Al0054U
CBR(3)=A.1AX110. t AMINKR (P^<3 ),T ) ,01 L, I )-C0*( 1)-CS^lI ) ) .AC00550
nut. waui l»UK| KAI>( fMAVAU KUilOKALJUAIt il^HUJL
19
DRA*AMINll CR*KR*ft(3fT|tCK**(2 v T)fR(2tTI )
OBA^AMlNlI CB*Kb*U(3tT ,CG*B 2iTliB(2,T J










R(i,TU) sAMINUKAJO, AUAXKO., RU f T l-C3«(VR( ill
RUtTUl^MINlfkAJOt AHAXiiO., R( 2 ,T l-CBR WRl 21)
R(3tTUHAf4iNi(R(3il)f AMAXMO., RUfTKiM^PDH
B( lfTn)«AMi:U< JAlCf A.-IAXllO.t M 1 , T l-CRB W 1{ 1U D«*A) I
BC2iTM)»AMlriiMAlCi AMAxHO,, 1( ^ , T H»C*6 (V J( j ) ) - JdA))
B(3tTtil^M4IU( ti(->,U, AUaIU,, 3{3,TKKJ(/i{J|)H
10 CONTINUE
GO TC 5
Kim Rem100 FORMAT(/« RA(T )
X • JC(T)' J
JAITI aims
CP ROA tJL A
101 FORMATU3roF:>.2f JFf.21
111 FORMAT!/.* KR KJ CR
X • BE! RX r*£C« ,/I0F7,3)
121 FORMAT! • I LiltR Kii, KbiCiifCbfROA, BE A i ROl , Bf- it ROC? JEC: • I
21 FORMAT! lOr6 # J)
23 FORMATj/ZiUiiAB)
21 FORMAT! • HHlOR
END
R31
I TIES 5 R-B: • ,3A2,i2X,«3-R: «,3A2)
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